



PREPARE FOR THE WORST:  PROTECTING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN 
THE MODERN AGE OF BIOTERRORISM 
Eleanor E. Mayer* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Americans began hoarding Cipro—a drug that can be used to 
treat anthrax—within a month of the 9/11 attacks.  As if to confirm 
their fears, an anthrax scare gripped the nation in a matter of weeks.  
The threat of a bioterrorist attack had been contemplated before, but 
it was brought into sharp relief during the anthrax crisis.  In part as a 
result of the juxtaposition of 9/11 and the anthrax scare, bioterror-
ism response plans have become a central aspect of emergency pre-
paredness. 
This Comment will examine the practical effects of recent devel-
opments in bioterrorism response plans.  I will argue that states that 
have not engaged in a thoughtful modernization of their bioterror-
ism response laws have left their citizens vulnerable to unconstitu-
tional infringement of their civil liberties in the event of a bioterrorist 
attack, and that modernization is long overdue.  The bioterrorism re-
sponse legislation of three states (Minnesota, Mississippi, and Dela-
ware) illuminates the varying relationship of these plans to citizens’ 
constitutional rights.  I examine Delaware and Minnesota law because 
the statutes enacted in those states demonstrate different approaches 
to modernizing public health emergency laws; I analyze Mississippi 
law because it is one of the states that has not updated its laws that au-
thorize public health emergency response.  Delaware has largely en-
acted the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act (“MSEHPA” or 
“Model Act”),1 which is discussed below.  Minnesota has been noted 
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by one of the chief academic critics of the MSEHPA as an example of 
how the MSEHPA can be amended to conform with constitutional 
requirements for the protection of civil liberties.2  These three states 
provide a sample of the forms that such legislation can take and the 
impact that public health emergency legislation can have on constitu-
tional rights.  My analysis demonstrates that old public health laws 
that resemble those of Mississippi are insufficient to protect individu-
als from governmental encroachment upon their civil liberties in the 
event of a public health emergency.  The MSEHPA is not ideal, how-
ever, and if states enact comprehensive bioterrorism response legisla-
tion, they should use the MSEHPA as a template and add provisions 
designed to preserve the constitutional rights of the citizenry in the 
event of an attack of bioterrorism. 
Part II examines the MSEHPA, its implications, and the legal aca-
demic response to the Model Act.  Parts III and IV examine the right 
to procedural due process and the right to personal autonomy in 
three different states in terms of the kind of protection afforded (and 
not afforded) by bioterrorism response plans with respect to two pub-
lic health tools:  quarantine and mass vaccination.  The analysis of 
these rights sheds light on the debate regarding the balance between 
civil liberties and terrorism response because they are flashpoints—
rights guaranteed by the Constitution that are likely to be threatened 
by a poorly executed response to an act of bioterrorism.  The effects 
of quarantine on procedural due process rights and the effects of the 
use of mass vaccination on the right to personal autonomy are key 
because quarantine and vaccination are public health tools that are 
either currently in use or have been widely used throughout Ameri-
can history to prevent the spread of infectious disease.  In addition, 
examining the rights within the context of quarantine and vaccina-
tion provides an example of the implications of each of the plans. 
States that have not taken steps to modernize their laws regarding 
state police power with respect to such matters should recognize that 
the constitutional rights of their citizens are in jeopardy.  While De-
laware could adopt more protective measures that would still allow 
for effective responses to bioterrorism, the differences between the 
Delaware and Minnesota plans are dwarfed by the differences be-
tween the two modern plans and Mississippi’s statutory framework 
that provides for bioterrorism response.  Mississippi lacks nearly all of 
 
 2 George J. Annas, Bioterrorism, Public Health, and Human Rights, 21 HEALTH AFF. 94, 96 
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the protective measures present in the Minnesota or the Delaware 
plans.  Using the MSEHPA to modernize bioterrorism response law is 
a useful starting point, but it can be amended to provide additional 
protection for the rights of the citizenry.  In the case of public health 
measures like quarantine, the likelihood is that no realistic plan is go-
ing to be particularly palatable from the perspective of preserving 
civil liberties, but if states do implement quarantine, modern statutes 
are more likely to hold officials accountable for actions that infringe 
upon the civil rights of individuals and to provide protection for citi-
zens’ constitutional rights. 
II.  THE MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT 
Shortly after 9/11 and the anthrax scare that followed, the Cen-
ters for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) asked a multidisci-
plinary team at the Center for Law and the Public’s Health at George-
town University and Johns Hopkins University to draft a model 
statute to guide states seeking to update their public health emer-
gency laws.3  The team that undertook the project was established be-
fore 9/11; the Turning Point Public Health Statute Modernization 
Collaborative and the Center for Law and the Public’s Health began 
working towards a legal transformation of the public health system 
after the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation and the W.K. Kellogg 
Foundation funded the establishment of the Collaborative in 2000.4  
The initial focus of the Collaborative was to assess public health laws 
with regard to a range of public health issues, but after the 9/11 at-
tacks the team turned its attention to the pressing issue of bioterror-
ism.5 
The goal of the MSEHPA was to provide a template for moderniz-
ing public health emergency legislation that was tailored to current 
public health threats.6  The authors acknowledged in the Model Act’s 
accompanying commentary that some limitations on civil liberties 
may be necessary in an emergency, but they argued that the team set 
out to prevent infringement on civil liberties and to set a high bar for 
what can be deemed a public health emergency.7  The resulting 
 
 3 JAMES G. HODGE & LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, THE MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS 
ACT—A BRIEF COMMENTARY 9 (2002), http://www.publichealthlaw.net/MSEHPA/Center
%20MSEHPA%20Commentary.pdf. 
 4 Id. at 3. 
 5 Id. at 7. 
 6 Id. at 9. 
 7 Id. 
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model statute has had a substantial impact on state laws.8  As of July 
2006, thirty-eight states had adopted some portion of the MSEHPA.9  
The Model Act has also set off a firestorm of criticism about the 
sweeping powers it gives to state officials in the event of a public 
health emergency. 
George Annas, a law and public health professor at Boston Uni-
versity, is one of the chief academic opponents of the MSEHPA.  An-
nas has argued that the Model Act is too broad, applying to an exces-
sive range of public health incidents.10  In addition, Annas disputes 
the notion that all acts of bioterrorism should be handled by public 
health officials; he points out that much of the emergency response 
will be handled by medical professionals employed by hospitals and 
other private facilities, and that public health personnel should over-
see the process and provide guidance to the public,11 and therefore 
need not be granted such sweeping powers.  Annas also objects to the 
Act because it assumes the worst on several fronts.  To begin with, he 
has argued that many of the eventualities contemplated by the Model 
Act, including mass quarantine and forced vaccination, are unneces-
sary (and likely to be ineffective) in the event of an actual public 
health emergency.12  Also, Annas notes that the Model Act assumes 
that medical personnel and the public will be unwilling to cooperate 
with the relief effort in the event of an attack; he points out that the 
response to 9/11 should lead us to the opposite conclusion.13  Finally, 
Annas argues that the MSEHPA gives the governors of individual 
states and health officials acting under their authority far too much 
power.14 
Lawrence Gostin, a prominent public health law scholar based at 
Georgetown University, takes a different view of the matter; he and 
his colleagues see legal reform of public health emergency laws as an 
essential component of national security planning.  They argue that 
many state public health laws are out of date, designed to respond to 
old public health threats that are no longer among our chief con-
 
 8 Even the impact of the Model Act, however, is debated.  George Annas, an opponent of 
the MSEHPA, has argued that its impact on state legislation has been overstated.  See An-
nas, supra note 2, at 96. 
 9 CTR. FOR LAW AND THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH, supra note 1. 
 10 George J. Annas, Blinded by Bioterrorism:  Public Health and Liberty in the 21st Century, 13 
HEALTH MATRIX 33, 51 (2003). 
 11 Id. at 51–52. 
 12 Id. at 46. 
 13 Id. at 51. 
 14 Id. at 49. 
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cerns.15  They contend that older public health emergency laws do 
not reflect either current understanding of medical science nor the 
recognition of individual rights that has become enshrined in law and 
bioethics in recent years.16  Gostin and his colleagues also argue that 
the variation among public health laws from state to state could im-
pede a response to a multistate public health emergency.17  Finally, 
Gostin and his colleagues contend that many state statutory frame-
works that govern public health emergencies are confusing and could 
lead to delay in the event of an attack of bioterrorism.18  They view 
the MSEHPA as a solution to these problems. 
State laws adopted in recent years to respond to bioterrorist 
threats will have a huge impact on the lives of ordinary citizens in the 
event of an attack.  The bioterrorism bill passed in 2002 by the fed-
eral government—the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Pre-
paredness and Response Act19—relies a great deal on the response of 
states because much of the authority to respond to public health 
emergencies lies within the purview of state police power.  The fed-
eral government also has considerable public health emergency 
power, however, as I will discuss below.20  As a result, the variations in 
state public health emergency legislation could mean that citizens’ 
constitutional rights could be vitiated in State A, where the legislature 
has enacted one statutory framework, and could remain much more 
protected in State B, where the statutory framework balances the ten-
sion between preservation of public health and civil liberties differ-
ently. 
III.  QUARANTINE 
One of the key responses to public health emergencies envisioned 
by laypeople is quarantine.  Quarantine has been discussed exten-
sively in popular discourse; leper colonies make an appearance in at 
least one classic film about the ancient world,21 and anyone who has 
 
 15 Lawrence O. Gostin et al., The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act:  Planning for and 
Response to Bioterrorism and Naturally Occurring Infectious Diseases, 288 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 622, 
623 (2002). 
 16 Id. at 623–24. 
 17 Id. at 624. 
 18 Id. 
19  Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594. 
 20 See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 21 See, e.g., BEN-HUR (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1959) (providing an example of the cinematic 
treatment of an ancient leper colony). 
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ever visited the museum at Ellis Island knows that people coming into 
the United States were often quarantined to ensure that they were 
not carrying infectious diseases before they were allowed to enter the 
country.22  More recently, the use of quarantine and isolation as pub-
lic health tools made the national news when Andrew Speaker—the 
so-called “traveling tuberculosis patient”—was isolated at the National 
Jewish Medical and Research Center in Denver for eight weeks while 
he received treatment.23 
Quarantine has been used to control disease for centuries.  Ailing 
individuals are isolated from their communities in the Bible,24 and 
individuals infected (or possibly infected) with the bubonic plague 
were isolated in Europe during the Middle Ages.25  Quarantine is dis-
tinct from isolation; quarantine is the separation of well persons pre-
sumed to be exposed to an infectious agent from the general popula-
tion, whereas isolation is the separation of persons already ill with an 
infectious disease from those around them.26  Quarantine powers 
were established in the United States as early as 1796, when, in re-
sponse to a yellow fever epidemic, Congress passed a statute that al-
lowed the federal government to assist states in establishing quaran-
tine.27  Massachusetts passed the nation’s first comprehensive public 
health powers statute shortly thereafter, in 1797, and that statute es-
tablished the first state quarantine powers in the new nation.28 
Quarantine was implemented at various times during the first one 
hundred and thirty years of American history.  A substantial facility 
for detaining yellow fever victims was constructed outside of Phila-
 
 22 See National Library of Medicine, Images from the History of the Public Health Service:  
Disease Control and Prevention, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/exhibition/phs_history/
21.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2009) (discussing the history of disease control and preven-
tion in the immigration context). 
 23 Speaker was diagnosed with tuberculosis in January 2007, and doctors asked him not to 
travel after they discovered that his tuberculosis was resistant to a number of drugs often 
used to treat the infection.  See Denise Grady, Fed up, TB traveler hits back at his critics, INT’L 
HERALD TRIB., June 11, 2007, at 7; Miranda Hitti, Andrew Speaker Released from Hospital, 
WEBMD HEALTH NEWS, July 26, 2007, http://www.medicinenet.com/script/main/
art.asp?articlekey=82856. 
 24 See Leviticus 13:46 (stating that infected persons must live in isolation). 
 25 Michelle A. Daubert, Comment, Pandemic Fears and Contemporary Quarantine:  Protecting 
Liberty Through a Continuum of Due Process Rights, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 1299, 1302 (2007). 
 26 Danitza Tomianovic, Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, Div. of Global Migration 
and Quarantine, Quarantine:  February 2006 CDC COCA Conference Call, 4–5 (2006) 
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/coca/ppt/quarantine_020706.ppt. 
 27 Daubert, supra note 25, at 1303–04. 
 28 Id. 
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delphia in 1799 following a yellow fever epidemic.29  Quarantines 
were often established to protect the American population from dis-
eases that could be brought in by ships arriving from foreign coun-
tries.  In 1808, for example, the Boston Board of Health began re-
quiring that ships from the Mediterranean, the Caribbean, and other 
tropical ports be quarantined for three days or not dock until a full 
twenty-five days had passed since they left the last port, whichever was 
longer.30  Nonetheless, large-scale quarantine has not been imposed 
in the United States since the Spanish influenza epidemic of 1918.31 
Under current law, both states and the federal government have 
the power to impose quarantine.32  The federal government’s power 
to establish quarantine rests in several statutes:  Title 42 of the United 
States Code,33 the Stafford Act,34 and the Public Health Security and 
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002.35  Title 42 con-
fers power on the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Sur-
geon General, and the CDC to limit movement of individuals (both 
into and within the United States) to prevent the spread of disease.36  
Quarantine is authorized to prevent the spread of a limited number 
of communicable diseases; those diseases must be identified by Ex-
ecutive Order.37  The most recent such Executive Order, issued by 
President Bush in April 2003 and amended in 2005, contains an ex-
tensive list of “quarantinable” communicable diseases, including 
cholera, diphtheria, infectious tuberculosis, plague, smallpox, yellow 
fever, viral hemorrhagic fevers, SARS, and a variety of influenzas.38 
 
 29 Peter Tyson, History of Quarantine, NOVA/PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/typhoid
/quarantine.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2009) (providing an overview of the history of qu-
arantine). 
 30 Id. 
 31 Joseph Barbera et al., Large-Scale Quarantine Following Biological Terrorism in the United 
States:  Scientific Examination, Logistic and Legal Limits, and Possible Consequences, 286 J. AM. 
MED. ASS’N 2711, 2712 n.13 (2001). 
 32 Daubert, supra note 25, at 1304–08. 
 33 42 U.S.C. §§ 264, 266 (2000). 
 34 Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121–5206 
(2000) (repealed in part by the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 § 323, Pub. L. No. 106-390, 
114 Stat. 1552); see; JASON W. SAPSIN, CTR. FOR LAW AND THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH AT 
GEORGETOWN AND JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVS., OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL AND STATE QUARANTINE 
AUTHORITY 4 (2002), http://www.publichealthlaw.net/Resources/ResourcesPDFs/
4quarantine.pdf; Daubert, supra note 25, at 1308. 
 35 Pub. L. No. 107–188, 116 Stat. 594. 
 36 42 U.S.C. § 264 (2000). 
 37 SAPSIN, supra note 34, at 2. 
 38 Exec. Order No. 13,295, 68 Fed. Reg. 17,255 (Apr. 4, 2003); Exec. Order No. 13, 375, 70 
Fed. Reg. 17,299 (Apr. 1, 2005); Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, Questions and 
Answers on the Executive Order Adding Potentially Pandemic Influenza Viruses to the 
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The Stafford Act provides a second avenue through which the 
federal government can establish quarantine.39  Following a declara-
tion of emergency, the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(“FEMA”) and a number of other agencies (including the Centers for 
Disease Control) are authorized to implement health and safety 
measures, which the Center for Law and the Public’s Health has in-
terpreted as including quarantine.40  The Public Health Security and 
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 authorizes the 
Department of Health and Human Services to provide assistance to 
states in the event of a bioterrorist attack, which arguably extends to 
assisting states in the establishment of quarantine.41 
State police power was extended to imposition of quarantine in 
Gibbons v. Ogden.42  The degree to which states articulate their power 
to impose quarantine, however, varies greatly.43  For the most part, 
state laws dealing with quarantine power discuss three major catego-
ries of concerns:  sexually transmitted diseases; “traditional” illnesses, 
such as smallpox; and “re-emerging” infections, such as tuberculosis, 
which, after a number of years of dormancy, appear to be re-
surfacing.44  In addition, a number of states have amended their old 
statutory frameworks or passed new laws to respond to specific con-
cerns that arose after 9/11.45 
Quarantine, while arguably a useful public health tool, poses a 
threat to civil liberties, including the right to due process.  The Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution state that persons 
cannot be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of 
law.46  Due process jurisprudence has developed into two categories:  
substantive and procedural.  Substantive due process jurisprudence is 
a vast area of constitutional law that has encompassed everything 
from the right of women to use contraception to the right of parents 
 
List of Quarantinable Diseases, (2006) http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dq/qa_influenza_
amendment_to_eo_13295.htm#diseasesadded (noting that SARS was added to the list in 
2003 and the other diseases have been on the list since 1983); Tomianovic, supra note 26. 
 39 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121–5208 (2000). 
 40 SAPSIN, supra note 34, at 4. 
 41 Id. 
 42 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 203 (1824); Daubert, supra note 25, at 1304. 
 43 SAPSIN, supra note 34, at 5. 
 44 Id.; see also Paula Mindes, A Tuberculosis Quarantine:  A Review of Legal Issues in Ohio and 
Other States, 10 J.L. & HEALTH 403, 405–06 (1995) (discussing the re-emergence of tuber-
culosis since the 1980s). 
 45 SAPSIN, supra note 34, at 5. 
 46 U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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to direct the education of their children.47  This Part of the paper ex-
amines only the procedural due process implications of the various 
state bioterrorism response plans.  Certain aspects of substantive due 
process implicated by bioterrorism response are discussed in the por-
tion of the paper that analyzes the threats to civil liberties associated 
with mass vaccination. 
Quarantine requires collective action; quarantine is most effective 
when ninety percent of the affected population is compliant with the 
quarantine order.48  So any effective quarantine would have to apply 
to almost all individuals, including those opposed to it.  One of 
George Annas’s objections to the MSEHPA is its contemplation of 
quarantine,49 despite the fact that mass quarantine has not been im-
plemented for the better part of a hundred years (as noted above).  
One obvious interest implicated by the prospect of quarantine is the 
liberty interest; because quarantine would limit the right of individu-
als to move around, the most basic understanding of liberty would be 
compromised by quarantine.  As held in Foucha v. Louisiana, 
“[f]reedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of the 
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary govern-
mental action.”50  In O’Connor v. Donaldson, Chief Justice Burger 
stated that involuntary commitment of any kind constitutes “a depri-
vation of liberty which the State cannot accomplish without due 
process of law.”51  Quarantine and isolation implicate “the most ele-
mental of liberty interests—the interest in being free from physical 
detention by one’s own government.”52  Nonetheless, freedom from 
bodily restraint is not absolute; even outside the criminal context, ex-
amples of such governmental restraint exist, particularly in the con-
text of mental illness treatment.53  Arguably, quarantine serves a simi-
lar function.  The deprivation of liberty has the potential to benefit 
the individual (by increasing the chances that she will get appropriate 
treatment) as well as the population as a whole (by detaining people 
 
 47 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 
400–03 (1923). 
 48 Mark A. Rothstein & Meghan K. Talbott, Encouraging Compliance with Quarantine:  A Pro-
posal to Provide Job Security and Income Replacement, 97 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S49 (2007). 
 49 Annas, supra note 10, at 33. 
 50 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992). 
 51 422 U.S. 563, 580 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
 52 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004). 
 53 See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 605–06 (1979) (holding that children can be com-
mitted to mental institutions by their parents or guardians without an adversarial hear-
ing). 
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who may be dangerous to others), thus mirroring the dual purposes 
of mental illness treatment. 
Procedural due process rights reflect the context in which they 
are applied.  The Supreme Court has held that the interests of the 
individual must be balanced with the interests of the state, while 
keeping in mind what benefits might arise from additional process.54  
Within the mental health context, for example, the Supreme Court 
limited the rights of minors to procedural due process in part be-
cause states do not have the resources to second-guess (via an adver-
sarial hearing) every medical decision made by parents on behalf of 
their children.55  The Supreme Court cited a number of reasons for 
holding that an adversarial hearing was unnecessary to protect the 
rights of children being committed to mental institutions despite 
their objections.56  Likewise, courts have held that states need not be 
held to the due process standards of less urgent proceedings, such as 
criminal trials, when establishing quarantine.57 
The Fourteenth Amendment requires that states afford individu-
als specific due process protections before depriving them of life, lib-
erty, or property.  Basic procedural requirements often include no-
tice, a hearing, access to counsel, and a final decision that is 
accompanied by an opportunity to seek review of that decision.58  
Confinement for medical reasons has been deemed an infringement 
on liberty interests in other contexts.  In 1979, the Supreme Court 
held that civil commitment for psychiatric purposes constitutes a de-
privation of liberty and cannot be imposed without sufficient proc-
ess.59  The Supreme Court has limited the right of the state to commit 
mentally ill persons who were not a threat to themselves or those 
around them to psychiatric facilities.60  The Court has also held that 
the loss of liberty through one set of constitutionally sufficient proce-
dures is insufficient to justify the loss of liberty in another context.61  
Courts have held that quarantines are subject to many of the same 
 
 54 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976). 
 55 Parham, 442 U.S. at 605–06. 
 56 Id. at 605–08. 
 57 See, e.g., Morales v. Turman, 562 F.2d 993, 998 (5th Cir. 1977) (citing Jacobson v. Massa-
chusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 29–30 (1905)). 
 58 Daubert, supra note 25, at 1316–17; see, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
 59 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432–33 (1979); see Mindes, supra note 44, at 413–15. 
 60 See O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975). 
 61 See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491–92 (1980) (holding that a prison could not transfer 
an inmate to a mental hospital without a hearing despite the fact that he had already 
been adjudicated in the criminal justice system). 
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due process requirements as civil commitments for mental illness,62 
and many state laws, including those discussed below, reflect that de-
velopment.  Because quarantine serves a similar purpose as civil 
commitment for mental illness treatment, similar procedures may be 
required in the event of a modern quarantine, and updated public 
health laws, such as those of Minnesota and Delaware, provide for a 
number of due process protections in the event of quarantine (dis-
cussed below). 
Mathews v. Eldridge, as noted above, established that courts should 
employ a balancing test to determine what kind of process is due, tak-
ing into consideration the benefit of additional process to the indi-
vidual and the cost to the state of requiring additional procedures.63  
The establishment of the Mathews test suggests that statutes that bal-
ance the benefits of preserving civil liberties and the burdens of pro-
viding additional process are more likely to withstand judicial scru-
tiny.  Therefore, the value of state bioterrorism response plans should 
be measured by the degree to which the plans stress the preservation 
of individual liberty as a goal separate from that of protecting the po-
pulace from the danger of a biological agent.  The following Part ex-
amines the three state plans with that question in mind and con-
cludes that however flawed modern bioterrorism response laws may 
be, they provide concrete protections for constitutional rights that 
some old public health emergency laws lack. 
A.  Minnesota 
Minnesota statutory law requires that any quarantine be instituted 
by the “least restrictive means necessary.”64  It contains substantial re-
quirements to protect the due process rights of quarantined and iso-
lated individuals.  (For the sake of clarity, the due process protection 
provisions for all of the plans are summarized at the end of the state-
specific discussion.)  The Minnesota legislature appears to have con-
templated what shape a quarantine might take and attempted to pro-
vide for the kind of quarantine that would be least frightening to the 
Minnesota citizenry; the statute anticipates establishing quarantine of 
individuals in their own homes (though it does not limit the power of 
 
 62 See Mindes, supra note 44, at 417 (noting that courts sometimes apply the procedural due 
process protections required for civil commitment in quarantine cases). 
 63 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976). 
 64 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.419, subdiv. 2(b) (West 2005 & Supp. 2009). 
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the state to quarantine in other locations).65  Another component of 
the Minnesota quarantine powers statute that must be the result of 
careful assessment of the risks of quarantine is the requirement that 
quarantined and isolated individuals be given a “reliable means” to 
communicate with health officials (presumably these would often be 
the same officials responsible for placing them in quarantine in the 
first place) twenty-four hours a day.66  The express purpose of this 
provision is to ensure that health emergencies do not go unattended.  
It also helps to ensure, however, that the requirements of another 
provision, stating that individuals be immediately released if they do 
not pose a known risk to the others, will be adequately met.67  Func-
tionally speaking, this means that at any time of day a quarantined 
individual who suspects she is no longer contagious can seek out a 
health official and ask her to confirm the legitimacy of her continued 
quarantine. 
In addition to the requirement that quarantined and isolated in-
dividuals be able to communicate with health professionals, there is a 
statutory requirement that family members of persons who are iso-
lated or quarantined be able to enter the area to which individuals 
are restricted.68  This requirement lessens the possibility that large 
numbers of the population would end up quarantined for an indefi-
nite amount of time without access to friends and family who could 
advocate for their speedy release.  Finally, Minnesota law requires 
that isolation or quarantine must automatically terminate when the 
court order that instituted it expires or at the point at which health 
officials deem the persons involved no longer a risk to others, which-
ever occurs first.69 
B.  Delaware 
Delaware’s quarantine powers track those of Minnesota to a cer-
tain degree.  It lays out similar requirements to protect the due proc-
ess rights of quarantined individuals.  Delaware too requires that the 
state must use the “least restrictive means necessary” to prevent the 
spread of disease in the event of a public health emergency.70  But in 
 
 65 Id. § 144.419, subdiv. 2(b). 
 66 Id. § 144.419, subdiv. 2(d). 
 67 Id. § 144.419, subdiv. 2(f). 
 68 Id. § 144.419, subdiv. 5(b). 
 69 Id. § 144.419, subdiv. 3. 
 70 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 20, § 3136(1)(c) (2005). 
  
Apr. 2009] PROTECTING CIVIL LIBERTIES 1063 
 
comparing the Delaware and Minnesota emergency health powers, 
the devil is in the details. 
The Delaware plan does not require, for example, that quaran-
tined and isolated individuals have access to health officials twenty-
four hours a day, which heightens the risk that individuals will be qu-
arantined or isolated and then ignored, particularly since it is cou-
pled with the fact that the Delaware quarantine powers do not re-
quire immediate release of a person who poses no risk to the public 
and do not require that the risk be “known,” as the Minnesota plan 
requires.  Delaware law requires that a quarantine be terminated 
when the person no longer poses an ongoing risk, but it leaves more 
power in the hands of the health official, which, as noted above, the 
individual seeking to be released may or may not be able to contact.71  
It does not require that family members be able to enter the quaran-
tine/isolation area, thereby excluding those most likely to serve as 
advocates for those who have been detained, and also may pose addi-
tional constitutional concerns beyond the range of the present dis-
cussion.  For example, the constitutional requirement that parents 
should be able to oversee the care of their children might be placed 
in jeopardy under such circumstances.72 
On the other hand, the Delaware quarantine powers contain cer-
tain aspects that Minnesotans might want to add to their statutory 
provisions for quarantine and isolation, the most significant of which 
is the standard of proof needed to institute quarantine.  Delaware law 
requires “clear and convincing evidence” that individuals pose a risk 
to others before quarantine or isolation can be imposed.73  In addi-
tion, the Delaware plan requires that a person must pose “a signifi-
cant risk of transmitting a disease to others with serious conse-
quences” in order to justify quarantine.74  While one might argue that 
no state would go through the trouble of instituting a quarantine 
without the prospect of “serious consequences,” one of the objections 
to the MSEHPA was that it was too broad and contemplated govern-
ment action in terms that were overly expansive.75  Given that due 
process is a continual balancing act, as evidenced by the test laid out 
 
 71 Id. § 3136(2)(b). 
 72 In 1923, the Supreme Court held that there were limits to the degree the state could in-
terfere with a parent’s right to control the education of his children.  Meyer v. Nebraska, 
262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
 73 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 20, § 3136(2)(a). 
 74 Id. § 3136(2)(a). 
 75 Id.; Annas, supra note 2, at 51–52. 
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in Mathews, the addition of clear standards and a reminder of the cir-
cumstances in which quarantine and isolation can be legitimately im-
posed provides additional protection for the constitutional rights of 
the citizenry.76 
C.  Mississippi 
Mississippi provides yet another perspective on post-9/11 health 
emergency response.  While Mississippi law provides for the estab-
lishment of quarantine, the statutes that do so are quite old—one of 
them was passed in 1950.77  The quarantine laws in Mississippi do not 
designate what kind of court proceedings are required to establish 
quarantine; they do not indicate a system for appeal once quarantine 
is established.  They do not state what kind of evidence is required to 
quarantine an individual or under what circumstances the quarantine 
will come to an end.  They do not establish who can visit people in 
quarantine or who will treat them, and they lack the requirement, 
present in both the Delaware and Minnesota statutes, that the space 
in which individuals are quarantined be managed appropriately so as 
to maintain a hygienic environment.78  In sum, Mississippi quarantine 
laws lack the requirements (as explained below) that both Delaware 
and Minnesota included to protect the due process rights of indi-
viduals quarantined or isolated by the state. 
Mississippi law also provides for specific power to quarantine indi-
viduals with sexually transmitted infections (“STIs”),79 which makes 
little scientific sense.  A recent CDC report suggests that quarantine is 
usually imposed to prevent the spread of diseases that are passed eas-
ily from person to person, often through airborne transmission, such 
as Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (“SARS”), as opposed to STIs 
like AIDS, which is not on the “quarantinable” diseases list found in 
the most recent Executive Order on the matter.80  The timing of the 
passage of the law is telling; it was made effective in 1983, in the early 
 
 76 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976). 
 77 MISS. CODE ANN. § 21-19-3 (2007); id. § 41-23-5. 
 78 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 20, § 3136(3)(a); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.419, subdiv. 2(h) (West 
2005); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-23-5. 
 79 MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-23-27. 
 80 Exec. Order No. 13,295, 68 Fed. Reg. 17,255 (Apr. 4, 2003); Ctrs. for Disease Control and 
Prevention, Public Health Guidance for Community-Level Preparedness and Response to Severe 
Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) Version 2, Supplement:  Community Containment Measures, 
Including Non-Hospital Isolation and Quarantine, Frequently Asked Questions About Use of Com-
munity Containment Measures, (2004) http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/sars/guidance/d/
word/app2. doc (2004). 
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years of the AIDS crisis.  We now know that quarantine is unnecessary 
to prevent the spread of STIs, and this law is an example of the kind 
of antiquated law that does not respond to current concerns de-
scribed by Lawrence Gostin and his colleagues.81  Indeed, in the 
course of a search for recent small-scale quarantines in Delaware, 
Minnesota, and Mississippi, I discovered only two such examples:  
both in Mississippi, and both involving men with HIV, one who was 
gay and one who was a male prostitute.82  One would hope that in the 
course of a modernization of public health emergency legislation, 
Mississippi would eliminate laws that unnecessarily stigmatize those 
affected by sexually transmitted diseases. 
D.  Due Process Requirements 
The Minnesota and Delaware quarantine powers statutes have 
similar procedural requirements.  Both require a court order to initi-
ate non-emergency quarantine or isolation.83  Both provide for tem-
porary quarantine without a court order and require that the public 
health authority request an order after initiating the quarantine or 
isolation.84  Both require that quarantined or isolated individuals have 
access to counsel in the event of a hearing and require that people 
who cannot afford counsel be provided with representation at state 
expense.85 
In many cases Minnesota law is more protective than Delaware 
law.  Minnesota, for example, requires notice of quarantine or isola-
tion; Delaware provides an out, allowing officials to provide reasons 
that notice is impractical.86  One substantial difference is that Minne-
sota allows the state to detain individuals without a hearing for up to 
twenty-one days; Delaware does not place an outside limit on how 
long the state can detain an individual under quarantine, though the 
statute does require that a hearing be held within seventy-two hours if 
one is requested by the detained individual.87  Delaware, however (as 
 
 81 Gostin et. al., supra note 15, at 623. 
 82 See Carter v. State, 803 So. 2d 1191 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999); Male Prostitute in Mississippi Put 
Under Quarantine Order, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1987, at B17.  In Carter v. State, the defendant 
was sentenced to five years in prison for violating a quarantine order that required him to 
inform his sexual partners of his HIV status and “refrain from any activity whereby his 
blood would be commingled with others’ blood.”  803 So. 2d at 1193. 
 83 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 20, § 3136(5)(c); MINN. STAT. § 144.4195, subdiv. 1(a). 
 84 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 20, § 3136(5)(d); MINN. STAT. § 144.4195, subdiv. 2(a). 
 85 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 20, § 3136(7)(b); MINN. STAT. § 144.4195, subdiv. (2)(a). 
 86 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 20, § 3136(5)(b)(7); MINN. STAT. § 144.4195, subdiv. 1(c). 
 87 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 20, § 3136(5)(e); MINN. STAT. § 144.4195, subdiv. 1(e). 
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noted above), requires a standard of clear and convincing evidence 
to initiate quarantine; under Minnesota law, ex parte orders for qua-
rantine can be granted if “probable cause exists to believe isolation or 
quarantine is warranted to protect the public health.”88  As noted 
above, the Mississippi laws governing quarantine lack all of these pro-
cedural protections, demonstrating that the most important distinc-
tion is not between the different modern statutes but between the 
modern statutes and the old statutes; the newer statutes provide 
much more comprehensive protection of civil liberties. 
IV.  VACCINATION 
In the event of an attack of bioterrorism, one of the primary pub-
lic health tools that might be implemented to prevent the spread of 
an infectious agent is mass vaccination.  For example, the spread of 
smallpox, one of the oldest tools of bioterrorism,89 might be best pre-
vented by vaccinating everyone in the affected area.  The smallpox 
vaccine has not been widely distributed in the United States since 
1972 when the disease was eradicated from the United States, but the 
CDC currently holds enough vaccine to immunize everyone in the 
United States in the event of an emergency.90 
The MSEHPA contemplates mass vaccinations, and it contains a 
provision that states should quarantine or isolate members of the 
population who refuse to be vaccinated.91  Some health law scholar-
ship has argued that any vaccination program responding to a major 
health emergency should be mandatory, as the benefit to many out-
weighs the potential harm to a few.92  Indeed, Gostin argued in publi-
cations predating the MSEHPA that public health as a discipline re-
 
 88 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 20, § 3136(2)(a); MINN. STAT. § 144.4195, subdiv. (1)(a). 
 89 During the French and Indian War (1754–63), the British gave blankets carrying the 
smallpox virus to Native Americans allied with the French.  Huge numbers of Native 
Americans died from the disease as a result; they had never been exposed to the disease 
and had no opportunity to build up immunity.  Colette Flight, Silent Weapon:  Smallpox 
and Biological Warfare, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/coldwar/pox_weapon
_01.shtml (last visited Mar. 26, 2009). 
 90 Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, Smallpox Fact Sheet:  Vaccine Overview, http:
//www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/smallpox/vaccination/facts.asp (last visited Mar. 26, 2009). 
 91 MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT, art. VI, § 603(a)(3) (2001). 
 92 Brendon Kohrs, Note, Bioterrorism Defense:  Are State Mandated Compulsory Vaccination Pro-
grams an Infringement upon a Citizen’s Constitutional Rights?, 17 J.L. & HEALTH 241 (2002–
2003). 
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quires collective action; individuals cannot provide for minimum 
standards of health acting alone.93 
Immunizations, however, are controversial for a number of rea-
sons.  Some Americans object to vaccines on spiritual grounds; most 
states allow parents to forego vaccinations for children for religious 
reasons.94  In West Virginia, one of the two states that does not allow 
such religious exemptions, an anti-mandatory vaccine group is cur-
rently advocating for exemptions, indicating that objection to vac-
cines in that state is a live issue.95  In addition, a health-related anti-
vaccine movement has recently emerged.  Of particular concern to 
parents in recent years has been the speculated link between vaccines 
containing thimerosal and the increasing prevalence of autism spec-
trum disorders, which by some estimates affect one in every 150 
American children.96  Though the CDC and the Institute of Medicine 
state that available evidence does not support the supposed link be-
tween vaccines and autism,97 many parents remain wary.98  Recent 
news coverage indicates that some parents seek religious exemptions 
for their children’s vaccinations despite the fact that they do not be-
long to a religion that objects to immunizations because they are 
concerned about the health ramifications.99  Finally, a firestorm of 
controversy arose surrounding the introduction of the human papil-
lomavirus (HPV) vaccine, which is recommended for eleven to 
twelve-year-old girls and can be given to girls as young as nine years 
old.100  Some social conservatives initially objected to vaccinating 
 
 93 LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW:  POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 7 (2001). 
 94 See West Virginians for Vaccination Exemption, http://www.wvve.info (last visited Mar. 
26, 2009) (urging legislation in West Virginia to provide the exemptions already available 
in most states).  In Mississippi, one of the few states that lacks a religious exemption for 
immunizations, a law that allowed religious exemptions was held unconstitutional under 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  Brown v. Stone, 378 So. 2d. 218 (Miss. 1979), cert. denied, 
449 U.S. 887 (1980).  See also Donya Khalili & Arthur Caplan, Off the Grid:  Vaccinations 
Among Homeschooled Children, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 471, 473 & n.43 (2007). 
 95 West Virginians for Vaccination Exemption, Religious Reasons, http://www.wvve.info/
issues/religious.html (last visited March 26, 2009). 
 96 Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, Mercury and Vaccines (Thimerosal), http://
www.cdc.gov/vaccinesafety/concerns/thimerosal.htm (last visited March 26, 2009). 
 97 Id. 
 98 Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Book Is Rallying Resistance to the Antivaccine Crusade, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
13, 2009, at D1. 
 99 Associated Press, Parents Claim Religion to Avoid Vaccines for Kids, MSNBC.COM, Oct. 17, 
2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21347434/. 
100 CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, HPV VACCINE QUESTIONS & ANSWERS 
(2006), http://www.cdc.gov/std/hpv/hpv-vaccine.pdf. 
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young girls, arguing that eliminating the risk of HPV would encour-
age sexual activity among teenagers.101 
In the event of a major public health emergency, the efficacy of 
vaccination as a tool to prevent the spread of disease will only be as 
extensive as the vaccination program is comprehensive.  Every person 
who remains unvaccinated in such a situation arguably becomes a risk 
to the people living around her, and so the question arises of how to 
respond to an individual’s refusal to be vaccinated.  Modern case law 
indicates that the right to refuse medical treatment is enshrined in 
constitutional law.102  The analysis of Minnesota, Delaware, and Missis-
sippi statutes highlights the different ways that states balance the use 
of vaccination as a public health tool with the preservation of indi-
vidual civil liberties. 
A.  Privacy, Personal Autonomy, and Bodily Integrity 
Unlike the right to due process, there is no express constitutional 
provision providing for an individual’s right to privacy or personal 
autonomy, and the existence of that right has been hotly debated.  
This debate received substantial attention in 1987 when Robert 
Bork’s refusal to recognize such a right may have led many to oppose 
his nomination to the Supreme Court.103  Nonetheless, case law re-
garding a number of aspects of American life has coalesced into what 
we now understand as the right to bodily integrity and personal au-
tonomy. 
Modern case law regarding bodily integrity and personal auton-
omy provides a stark contrast with the key Supreme Court case on 
mass vaccinations.  In Jacobson v. Massachusetts the Court held that 
mandatory vaccinations were constitutional.104  Despite its consider-
able age (it was handed down in 1905), Jacobson is a crucial case in the 
public health legal framework, and scholars still regularly cite it.105  In 
Jacobson, the Court clearly stated that the liberty interest at stake is not 
absolute.106  As Justice Harlan stated, “[t]here are manifold restraints 
 
101 David Brown, HPV Vaccine Advised for Girls, WASH. POST, June 30, 2006, at A5. 
102 Cruzan v. Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269–70 (1990). 
103 Erwin Chemerinsky, Seeing the Emperor’s Clothes:  Recognizing the Reality of Constitutional Deci-
sion Making, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1069, 1076 (2006). 
104 197 U.S. 11 (1905). 
105 See, e.g., Daniel D. Stier et al., The Courts, Public Health, and Legal Preparedness, 97 AM. J. 
PUB. HEALTH S69 (2007) (citing the Jacobson decision authorizing mandatory smallpox 
vaccination). 
106 Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 26. 
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to which every person is necessarily subject for the common good.”107  
Jacobson, however, was decided before the modern individual rights 
doctrine was developed.  While the Supreme Court has not had to 
address the issue of mass vaccination recently and therefore has not 
had to reconcile recent decisions with the precedent laid out in Jacob-
son, modern requirements for personal autonomy in a medical set-
ting call that precedent into question. 
Beginning in 1965, the Supreme Court handed down a series of 
decisions that emphasized the importance of “zones of privacy” for 
individuals.108  The cases from the mid-1960s that led up to the vari-
ous abortion decisions established a right to privacy that is now un-
derstood more as a right to bodily integrity and personal autonomy.109  
In 1965, the Court struck down a Connecticut law that banned the 
use of contraception by married couples.110  Justice Douglas found the 
right to privacy in penumbras emanating from the First, Third, 
Fourth, and Fifth Amendments.111  Justice Harlan argued that the 
right to marital privacy was “implicit in the concept of ordered lib-
erty” provided for by the Fourteenth Amendment.112  Justices Gold-
berg, Warren, and Brennan found the right to privacy in the Ninth 
Amendment, which protects rights not specifically enumerated by the 
other nine amendments of the Bill of Rights.113  The Court empha-
sized that the doctrine of marital privacy was established long before 
the Bill of Rights.114  Griswold reaffirmed that the Court was disin-
clined to allow the state to interfere with aspects of private individu-
als’ lives that traditionally had been free of state scrutiny. 
In Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court extended the holding of Griswold 
to include the right of unmarried persons to use contraception.115  In 
that opinion, Justice Brennan argued that the right of marital privacy 
was dependent on the right of the individuals in that marriage to pri-
vacy:  “If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the in-
 
107 Id. 
108 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 169 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). 
109 Seth F. Kreimer, Rejecting “Uncontrolled Authority Over the Body”:  The Decencies of Civilized 
Conduct, the Past and the Future of Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 423, 438–39 
(noting the discussion of “bodily integrity” in the Casey plurality). 
110 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479. 
111 Id. at 484. 
112 Id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 
(1937)). 
113 Id. at 487 (Goldberg, J., concurring); see also U.S. CONST. amend. IX. 
114 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486 (majority opinion). 
115 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
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dividual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmen-
tal intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the 
decision whether to bear or beget a child.”116  Though the holding in 
Eisenstadt rests largely on the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment (holding that treating similarly situated persons 
differently on the basis of marital status violates the Equal Protection 
Clause), Eisenstadt also served to expand the privacy protection in 
Griswold that rests on the doctrine of marital privacy into a broader 
notion that there should be a sphere of life relatively free from gov-
ernment intervention.117 
Roe v. Wade was a logical extension of the right to privacy, since 
the decision directly affected the right of women to control whether 
they were to “bear or beget a child.”118  The fundamental right of a 
pregnant woman to seek an abortion as identified in Roe is based on 
the liberty interest identified in the Due Process Clause.  Roe proved a 
divisive addition to the right to privacy doctrine, and contentious dis-
cussion of the right to privacy has often served as a proxy for an ongo-
ing debate about the validity of Roe.  Despite the controversy, Roe has 
survived a number of changes to the Court, though it has been lim-
ited by subsequent cases, particularly Planned Parenthood of Southeast-
ern Pennsylvania v. Casey119 and Gonzales v. Carhart.120 
The plurality opinion in Casey focuses on a right to “bodily integ-
rity”—a right that is never explicitly mentioned in Roe, but which the 
Court in Casey stated was established when Roe was decided.121  The 
authoring Justices found that the principle of bodily integrity became 
enshrined in constitutional law in part through a range of cases de-
cided between Roe and Casey, one of which was Cruzan v. Director, Mis-
souri Department of Health (discussed further below).122  As Professor 
Seth Kreimer noted in a recent article, however, the notion of bodily 
integrity arose in the medical context before Cruzan123; in Mills v. Rog-
ers, the Court found that involuntary administration of antipsychotic 
 
116 Id. at 453 (emphasis in original). 
117 Id. at 454. 
118 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 169 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) (citing Baird, 405 U.S. at 
453). 
119 505 U.S. 833, 899 (1992) (holding that states can require parental consent for abortions 
for minors, provided there is a judicial bypass). 
120 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (upholding a law that banned intact dilation and evacuation, a form 
of late-term abortion also known as partial-birth abortion). 
121 Casey, 505 U.S. at 849. 
122 Id. at 857; Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
123 Kreimer, supra note 109, at 438–40. 
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medication might violate the Due Process Clause,124 and that princi-
ple was confirmed in Washington v. Harper.125  Kreimer argues that the 
right to bodily integrity has become more entrenched in recent years 
as the Court has continued to hear the claims of plaintiffs seeking to 
protect themselves from physical intrusion sanctioned by the state.126  
Though Kreimer focuses on cases arising from incarceration, those 
cases have important implications for the rights of individuals in the 
context of a public health emergency, when individuals are more 
likely than usual to be under the physical control of government offi-
cials. 
Particularly important within the context of public health is the 
significance that medical decision-making holds within this doctrine.  
Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Roe all involved laws that limited the right of 
individuals to take advice offered by medical personnel or to undergo 
procedures that physicians would have been otherwise willing to per-
form had the law not intervened.  In each case, the Court limited the 
right of the state to intervene in decisions made by individuals at the 
recommendation or with the consent of their medical providers.  In 
Cruzan, a case involving a dispute about whether to terminate artifi-
cial hydration and nutrition being given to a woman in a persistent 
vegetative state, the Court clarified and extended this arc of jurispru-
dence.127  In that case, the Court noted the ancient principle, en-
shrined in tort law, that unwanted medical treatment constitutes a 
battery.128 
Cruzan limited that right in certain circumstances, holding that 
states can require “clear and convincing evidence” of an individual’s 
wish to die if a patient’s representatives seek to terminate life-
sustaining treatment.129  The Supreme Court has left much of the 
regulation surrounding the “right to die” up to the states, as evi-
denced by both Cruzan and Gonzales v. Oregon,130 in which the Su-
preme Court struck down the Justice Department’s attempts to inter-
fere with Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act.  The Act provides for 
physician-assisted suicide for terminally ill patients under highly regu-
 
124 Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982); Kreimer, supra note 109, at 437. 
125 494 U.S. 210, 221–22 (1990) (holding that the patient had a “liberty interest in avoiding 
the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs”). 
126 Kreimer, supra note 109, at 439–40. 
127 497 U.S. 261. 
128 Id. at 269–70. 
129 Id. at 280. 
130 546 U.S. 243 (2006). 
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lated and monitored circumstances.131  As a result, there is a space in 
which state regulation of end-of-life treatment remains effectively un-
regulated by constitutional jurisprudence.  According to Cruzan, 
states may limit the right to refuse life-saving medical treatment,132 but 
states may also provide for the right to physician-assisted suicide if the 
legislature chooses to do so.133  The right-to-die cases have important 
implications for individual rights in a public health emergency.  Cru-
zan stands for the understanding that individuals have a basic right to 
direct their medical care but also allows for the right of states to limit 
that right when important government interests are implicated.134  
The arc of cases including Roe, Casey, and Cruzan has created new ex-
pectations regarding individual privacy that have wide-ranging impli-
cations for the development of bioethics policy.  The precedent set by 
Jacobson, if challenged in the current context, will have to be recon-
ciled with the more modern understanding that individuals have a 
right to refuse medical care and to prevent government intrusion 
upon their persons. 
B.  Minnesota 
The Minnesota and Delaware statutes differ markedly as to how 
they treat vaccination in the event of a public health emergency.  
Minnesota law states that individuals under isolation or quarantine 
have “a fundamental right to refuse medical treatment, testing, physi-
cal or mental examination, [and] vaccination.”135  The statute goes on 
to state that if a quarantined person refuses to be vaccinated or oth-
erwise treated as indicated above, the person may have to remain in 
quarantine, but the statute is clearly designed to remind health offi-
cials and governing authorities that individuals do not lose their right 
to medical privacy in the context of isolation and quarantine.136  Fur-
thermore, because “the right to refuse all interventions continues in 
isolation and quarantine,”137 the threat of quarantine is less coercive. 
 
131 Oregon Department of Human Services—Public Health Division, FAQs about the Death 
with Dignity Act, http://oregon.gov/DHS/ph/pas/faqs.shtml (last visited Mar. 26, 2009). 
132 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280 (holding that a state can require “clear and convincing evidence” 
of the wishes of an incompetent patient to refuse life-saving treatment). 
133 Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 269–70. 
134 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280. 
135 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.419, subdiv. 4 (West 2005 & Supp. 2009). 
136 Id. 
137 Annas, supra note 2, at 96. 
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The point is confirmed in the statutory provision that governs 
general emergency powers:  the provision states that 
“[n]otwithstanding laws, rules, or orders made or promulgated in re-
sponse to a national security emergency, individuals have a funda-
mental right to refuse medical treatment . . . .”138  Furthermore, the 
provision requires that any health official administering treatment 
must inform the individual of her right to refuse treatment while not-
ing the consequences, including the possibility of isolation and quar-
antine.139  Given that constitutional rights have little power if people 
do not invoke them, this requirement may be the most important as-
pect of Minnesota’s statutory provisions governing vaccination in 
times of emergency. 
C.  Delaware 
Delaware takes a less protective approach.  It, too, addresses the 
issue of vaccination in its quarantine provisions, but the Delaware qu-
arantine statute views vaccination differently.  A refusal to accept 
emergency vaccination under Delaware law constitutes “prima facie 
evidence that said person should be quarantined or isolated”;140 in 
short, a refusal to be vaccinated creates a presumption in favor of qu-
arantine or isolation that then shifts the burden to rebut to the indi-
vidual—a presumption that might be difficult to overcome in the 
context of an emergency situation. 
In addition, the Delaware provision does not state that vaccination 
should be administered only to those individuals who consent, an 
important component of the Minnesota law.  Delaware law does not 
make clear whether individuals maintain their right to refuse medical 
treatment even in emergency situations, while Minnesota law is ex-
plicit on this point; notwithstanding a public health emergency, indi-
viduals have the right to refuse medical intervention.141  As a result, 
Delaware’s law also has no provision requiring health officials to in-
form individuals of their right to refuse medical treatment.  So even 
if—and the law is vague on this point—affected individuals do have 
the right to refuse medical treatment in an emergency situation gov-
erned by these statutes, many of them will not know about it.  The 
necessity of informed consent is one of the central principles of 
 
138 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 12.39, subdiv. 1. 
139 Id. subdiv. 2. 
140 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 20, § 3136(2)(a) (2005). 
141 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 12.39, subdiv. 1. 
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modern bioethics, and medical professionals overseeing the response 
to a public health emergency should be required by law to inform in-
dividuals of their rights. 
D.  Mississippi 
Mississippi’s statute governing the spread of contagious disease is 
vague on vaccinations.  The provision that presumably would govern 
most emergency health powers in Mississippi does not mention vac-
cination at all; it simply states that “governing authorities of munici-
palities shall have the power to make regulations to prevent the in-
troduction and spread of contagious or infectious diseases.”142  
Another provision, actually designed to address the question of im-
munizations for schoolchildren, contains the following:  “[T]he state 
health officer shall specify such immunization practices as may be 
considered best for the control of vaccine preventable diseases.”143  
Those two statements contain essentially all the emergency vaccina-
tion power authorized in the state of Mississippi, and, in large part 
because of their vagueness, the police power found within is largely 
unlimited.  They contain no acknowledgement of the fundamental 
right to refuse medical treatment (perhaps not surprisingly, since 
both the statutes predate Cruzan); the provisions fail to notify both 
the public and health officials of the rights of individuals that should 
be preserved in the event of a public health emergency.  The provi-
sions do not indicate what kind of emergency warrants mass vaccina-
tion.  They do not indicate what the consequences of refusal entail.  
In short, Mississippi law threatens the right of individuals to refuse 
medical treatment because they do not contain guidelines for public 
health emergencies.  Mississippi law indicates that modernization of 
public health emergency laws can clarify the rights of individuals in a 
public health crisis. States should update their public health emer-
gency laws, and they should take the approach that is the most pro-
tective of individual rights and, by extension, the approach that is 
most likely to withstand judicial scrutiny. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, old laws may not be enough, and new laws need to 
be drafted with care.  Delaware’s law is by no means perfect; the atti-
 
142 MISS. CODE ANN. § 21-19-3 (2007). 
143 Id. § 41-23-37. 
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tude taken towards mass vaccination under Delaware law appears to 
disregard the fundamental right of individuals to refuse unwanted 
medical treatment.  In addition, the fact that Minnesota takes a dif-
ferent—and more protective approach—indicates that reasonable 
minds could conclude that efforts to preserve that right can co-exist 
with comprehensive efforts to protect the public in the event of a 
health emergency.  Minnesota’s emergency health powers plan re-
quires that health officials be mindful of the medical privacy rights of 
individuals in the midst of potential chaos, and it requires that indi-
viduals themselves be continually reminded of those rights.  A few 
small changes to the Delaware plan would provide for additional pro-
tections of civil liberties in the event of an attack of bioterrorism.  Ei-
ther plan, however, provides more extensive protection than Missis-
sippi’s outdated laws, which provide vague and extensive power to 
vaccinate the public that is largely unlimited by recent developments 
in our understanding of constitutional rights. 
Quarantine is trickier.  Because quarantine and isolation involve a 
basic liberty interest—the right to go where we please when we please 
and not to be confined to one location by the state—any quarantine 
policy can seem draconian.  Annas’s concern that the contemplation 
of mass quarantine is more likely to elicit panic than protect public 
health is a valid one.  Delaware, and other states that have enacted 
much of the MSEHPA, would do well to consider amending certain 
provisions—putting an outside limit on the amount of time an indi-
vidual can be detained for public health reasons without a hearing, 
for example.  But Minnesota’s law, which Annas noted as an example 
of a more enlightened bioterrorism response plan, has provisions 
similar to those found in the corresponding Delaware statute, and 
both statutes track the MSEHPA to a considerable degree.  It is diffi-
cult to envision a quarantine plan that does not limit individual liber-
ties to a significant degree.  Some states may choose not to have such 
a plan for that reason; they may decide that to envision quarantine is 
to promote the use of it, and as a result they may wish to avoid the 
topic altogether.144 
The fact remains, however, that quarantine is an ancient public 
health tool, and many states may reach the conclusion that in order 
to prepare for an attack of bioterrorism, responsible quarantine pro-
 
144 Along similar lines, Annas has argued that “planning for mass vaccination . . . [is] more 
likely to foster public panic and distrust than to be effective in a real emergency.”  Annas, 
supra note 10, at 46. 
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cedures need to be on the books.  Current scholarship suggests that 
many public health professionals consider the possibility of quaran-
tine a live question in our current circumstances.145  If quarantine is 
implemented, a response plan drafted in advance that established the 
rights of citizens under quarantine might better preserve civil liber-
ties than an ad hoc response created in the charged political climate 
that developed following an attack of bioterrorism.  If states want to 
provide public health officials with quarantine authority, either the 
Minnesota or Delaware plan would provide greater protection for in-
dividual liberty than Mississippi’s current statutory framework.  Both 
plans have extensive requirements designed specifically to protect civ-
il liberties, while Mississippi’s law lacks any such provisions.  My analy-
sis of the Mississippi laws indicates that they leave the citizenry of Mis-
sissippi open to chaos in the event of a bioterrorist attack and provide 
no guidelines about how to preserve civil liberties in the event of an 
emergency.  Carefully drafted modernized response plans provide 
one option for states seeking simultaneously to prepare for a bioter-
rorist attack and to preserve the civil rights of their citizens. 
 
145 See Cécile M. Bensimon & Ross E.G. Upshur, Evidence and Effectiveness in Decisionmaking for 
Quarantine, 97 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S44, S44 (noting the renewed discussion of quarantine 
among policymakers, ethicists, and medical professionals); Rothstein, supra note 48, at 
S49 (noting the value of quarantine as a public health tool despite its restrictive nature). 
